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CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
RIGHT TO -SPEEDY TRIAL
Pre-arrest Delay
In State v. Stetson,' defendant complained that a seven
month delay between the alleged offense and his arrest
hampered his ability to present his defense, thereby denying
him due process of law. Although under the circumstances
the court affirmed his conviction, it recognized that the "due
process and fair trial" guarantees of the state and federal
constitutions may be infringed by inordinate pre-arrest delay
resulting in actual prejudice to an accused.2 It refused to
presume prejudice from the seven month delay, rejecting the
defendant's assertion in brief that no witnesses were called to
support his alibi because "no one could accurately testify to
his whereabouts seven months before his arrest"3  as
unsupported by the record.
As in cases dealing with delay prior to commencement of
trial,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that there are
two standards of protection for the accused. One is the
statutory standard found in articles of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 5 The other is a federal constitutional standard.6
In United States v. Marion7 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that applicable statutes of limitation do not
necessarily fully define the constitutional rights of the
accused. The Court rejected defendant's argument that the
sixth amendment right to speedy trial applied to
pre-accusation delay. The sixth amendment 8 by its terms only
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 317 So. 2d 172 (La. 1975).
2. Id. at 175.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); State v. Bullock, 311 So.
2d 242 (La. 1975); State v. Moore, 300 So. 2d 492 (La. 1974); State v. Harris, 297
So. 2d 431 (La. 1974).
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 571-77 (limitations on the institution of prose-
cution).
6. E.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
7. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
8. Applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
applies once the defendant has become an "accused." 9 The
Court, however, agreed, as the government conceded, that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment would require
dismissal of the prosecution if pre-accusation delay "caused
substantial prejudice to [the defendant's] right to a fair trial
and.., the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical
advantage over the accused." 10 The Court in Marion, however,
did not forecast "when and in what circumstances actual
prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the
dismissal of the prosecution."" Stetson did not formulate
detailed constitutional guidelines requiring dismissal for
pre-accusation or pre-arrest delay either. 2
Justice Summers indicates in Stetson some of the
differences between the not-yet-formulated constitutional
test for "inordinate pre-accusation delay" and the statutory
limitations set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
statutes have the "desirable ingredient of predictability"' 3
not present in Marion's vague guidelines. 4 Further, the
statutes protect against "possible, as distinguished from
actual, prejudice.' 5 Defendant must show actual prejudice
for pre-accusation delay to result in a denial of due process.
In neither Marion nor Stetson was actual prejudice shown,
and in Stetson, as in Marion, the court hesitated to formulate
a rule without the showing of actual prejudice.
The required showing of actual prejudice distinguishes
pre- and post-accusation delay. In cases of post-accusation
delay, Barker v. Wingo 16 does not require that prejudice
necessarily be shown. It is but one of several factors. 17 How-
ever, if a defendant complains of prejudice to his due process
9. Similarly, LA. CONST. art. I, § 16 insuring the right to speedy trial,
provides that "every person charged with a crime . .. is entitled to a speedy
... trial . . ." (emphasis added).
10. 404 U.S. at 324.
11. Id.
12. Justice Summers stated: "To accommodate the sound administration of
justice to the defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial will necessar-
ily involve a deliberate judgment based on the facts and circumstances of
each case. It would be unwise at this juncture to forecast those decisions."
317 So. 2d at 175-76.
13. Id. at 174.
14. Constitutional guidelines are also vague in the area of speedy trials.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
15. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 577.
16. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
17. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 75 (1975).
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right to a fair trial resulting from the delay of the prosecutor
or police in bringing the "accusation,"' 8 he bears the burden
of showing prejudice.
Pre-trial Delay and the Barker Test
In three cases 19 decided during the last term the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court clearly recognized that the defendant's
federal constitutional right to a speedy trial may well man-
date trial within a shorter period than that provided by the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. 20 In State v. Moore,2'
the court rejected the state's argument that the only criteria
lay in the code provisions. 22 The court held that the Barker
v. Wingo "balancing test"23 must be employed to determine
whether or not a defendant's federal constitutional right to
speedy trial has been denied. The United States Supreme
Court in Barker rejected "a rigid time formula" and outlined
four factors which must be weighed:
The factors which are to be considered are the length of
the delay, the reasons for the delay, the resulting prej-
udice to the defendant, and the defendant's assertion of
his right to a speedy trial.24
In State v. Bullock 25 the Louisiana Supreme Court further
recognized the trial or appellate court's authority to dismiss
the prosecution if unconstitutional delay has occurred. Nev-
18. The defendant, under Marion, becomes an accused when he is ar-
rested or when an indictment or information is filed, whichever comes first.
The concept of accusation is not synonymous with the Louisiana concept of
institution of prosecution which results from the filing of formal charges by
the prosecutor or grand jury as opposed to arrest and booking by a police
officer. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 201, 228, 382. Marion clearly envisions the
broad concept of becoming an "accused" as against the narrower concept of
institution of prosecution. 404 U.S. at 313-19.
19. State v. Bullock, 311 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975); State v. Moore, 300 So. 2d
492 (La. 1974); State v. Harris, 297 So. 2d 431 (La. 1974).
20. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 578. See also State ex rel. Eames v. Amis,
288 So. 2d 316 (La. 1974). For the defendant's state constitutional right to a
speedy trial, see LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
21. 300 So. 2d 492 (La. 1974).
22. Earlier in State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 257 So. 2d 388 (1972), the
court intimated that those limits might also reflect the outer limits of con-
stitutional mandates.
23. 407 U.S. at 530-33.
24. Id. at 530.
25. 311 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).
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ertheless, in applying the balancing test to evaluate uncon-
stitutional delay, appellate courts may approve rather
lengthy periods.26
In State v. Harris,27 the defendant, charged with aggra-
vated rape, was arrested on December 19, 1972. He was not
indicted until April 12, 1973, and thereafter arraigned on
April 23, 1973. The defendant was presumably in jail during
that period, bail or discharge having been denied following a
preliminary examination on February 1, 1973. He moved for a
speedy trial in July, 1973. When trial was set for October,
1973, the defendant moved to dismiss for denial of a speedy
trial. His motion was denied and he was tried and convicted in
October. The total period of incarceration from arrest to trial
was ten months.
In State v. Moore,28 the court approved a twenty-six
month delay from indictment to trial. Again, a defendant
charged with aggravated rape was presumably incarcerated
from arrest to trial.29 The court noted that all but the last
month of delay was attributable to re-assignment by the
state. However, at no time during that first twenty-five
months did the defendant move for speedy trial on the in-
dictment.30
In State v. Bullock,31 the defendant was arrested in 1966
for murder and tried within nine months of his arrest. Follow-
ing reversal of his conviction in 1971,32 the defendant did not
file a motion for a speedy second trial until January, 1974.
Four months thereafter, over eight years after the defen-
dant's arrest for murder, the defendant was again tried. He
was convicted of manslaughter. 33
In all three cases, the court found the delays reasonable
26. A delay of approximately five years was involved in Barker.
27. 297 So. 2d 431 (La. 1974).
28. 300 So. 2d 492 (La. 1974).
29. During that period he was also convicted of another rape with which
he was charged. See State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
30. As noted, 8upra, note 29, he was litigating another rape conviction.
31. 311 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).
32. See State v. Bullock, 263 La. 946, 269 So. 2d 824 (1972), after remand,
294 So. 2d 218 (La. 1974).
33. The defendant was charged with killing a policeman and was origi-
nally sentenced to death. The subsequent conviction for manslaughter illus-
trates to the writer that the delay probably prejudiced the state and worked
to the benefit of the accused. The court noted that the delay was to his
benefit. 311 So. 2d at 245.
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under the Barker test 34 in light of attendant circumstances.
The reasons found for the delay in Bullock were a new trial,
then defense motions, and the defendant's desire to await
clarifications of the law regarding the death penalty.35 Once
the defendant in Bullock made a demand for a speedy trial, a
lapse of only four months followed. Although the length of
delay was extensive, there was no prejudice to the accused.
On balance, there was, in the court's view, no denial of the
defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Similarly in Moore, despite a lengthy delay (twenty-six
months) the defendant made no demand for speedy trial on
the indictment in question for the first twenty-five months.
The reason ascribed to the delay was "pre-occupation" by the
state and defense with prosecution and appeal of another
rape charge. Although the defendant did allege that the delay
impaired the effectiveness of his alibi witnesses, thereby
prejudicing him in his defense, again, on balance the court
found no sixth amendment violation.
Likewise in Harris, in which the reason for the delay was
a crowded docket and a summer (July-August) recess (and not
the "procrastination ' 36 of the state) the court found no con-
stitution denial. Once demand was made, the defendant was
tried within three months. Despite the ten month length of
delay, "no other prejudice than the delay itself"'37 was claimed
by the defendant.
All three cases are examples of the application of the
Barker approach to the problem of speedy trials. The ap-
proach taken by the Louisiana court should be similar to the
"unnecessary delay" test outlined in Rule 48(1) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.38 Of course no "balancing" is
involved if the periods of limitations prescribed by the Code of
Criminal Procedure lapse. 39 Thus Louisiana now has two
tests: the Barker test and the code test. A defendant's chal-
lenge can, of course, be leveled under one or both. The defen-
dant's statutory and constitutional rights are protected by
the courts but their extent is uncertain. If any single factor
34. 407 U.S. at 530-33.
35. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
36. 297 So. 2d at 432.
37. Id. at 433.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1974). That broad approach was repudiated by
Congress in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.
39. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 572-83.
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appears significant, it is elapsed time until trial following
demand.
This approach seems fair and reasonable. When the par-
ties are not interested in achieving a quick trial, the interests
of public justice do not necessarily demand that the case be
prosecuted with haste. However, once a defendant demands a
speedy trial, a period of sixty to ninety days should be the
outside limits for holding an accused in custody without trial.
The interim limits for the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provide for
a release from custody, not dismissal, in the event over ninety
days lapse from the beginning of "continuous detention" to
the commencement of trial.40
The writer submits that Louisiana trial and appellate
courts should consider the use of their rulemaking power to
effectuate a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial.41
At the least the wrongly held prisoner should achieve release
from custody without monetary conditions 42 and the release
should follow if an accused in custody is nDt tried within a
short specified period following demand. Although speedy jus-
tice is often to the benefit of the state,43 not the defendant,
and although many defendants may not want speedy justice,
the courts should promulgate rules as a guide for setting
quick criminal trials for those who demand them and who are
incarcerated. The advantage local speedy trial rules" might
have over state-wide legislation is flexibility to meet local
conditions and the size of the criminal docket.4
The writer does not suggest that the problem of protect-
ing the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
should be viewed as the court's alone or the district attor-
ney's alone. The writer merely suggests that some effort
should be made toward establishing more certain constitu-
tional limits than the loose criteria of the Barker test.46
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1974). The 90-day rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1974) will
be in effect from July 1, 1975, until July 1, 1979, when the act takes full effect.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16. See also LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 701.
42. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 336 (providing for release on recogni-
zance). See also ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial § 4.2 (1968).
43. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 701 provides that the state as well as the
defendant has a right to a speedy trial.
44. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 18. See also LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A).
45. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b), providing for district court plans for
the prompt disposition of criminal cases.
46. See also ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial §§ 2.1-4.2 (1968); NATIONAL
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CHANGE OF VENUE
In State v. Bell,4 7 the court held that an accused has the
right to offer evidence of pretrial publicity and community
bias at a hearing on a motion for a change of venue. The
defendant cannot be restricted to an examination of prospec-
tive jurors alone to determine whether he can obtain a fair
trial in a particular community. He has the right to prove
that "the state of the public mind against the defendant is
such that jurors will not completely answer honestly upon
their voir dire, or witnesses will be so affected by the public
atmosphere that they will not testify freely and frankly."4
In Bell the defendants were "muslims" charged with in-
citing to riot, resulting in the deaths of two deputy sheriffs.
In a sincere effort to determine whether or not the defen-
dants could receive a fair trial in East Baton Rouge Parish
the trial court proposed that a "dry run voir dire"4 9 be con-
ducted. Three hundred individuals were randomly drawn
from the jury wheel to be examined. This was an effort to
determine from a cross-section of the community 5 whether
pretrial publicity and bias in the community would preclude a
fair trial. Following examination of a number of the sample of
prospective jurors, the trial court ruled, based on the re-
sponses given, that jurors could be selected from East Baton
Rouge Parish who could fairly try the case. 51
The trial court's error, according to the majority, lay in
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS
§ 4.1 (1972).
47. 315 So. 2d 307 (La. 1975).
48. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 622, comment (a), quoted with approval in 315
So. 2d at 310. Justice Dixon, author of the opinion, listed seven factors to be
considered: "Some relevant factors in determining whether to change venue
are (1) the nature of pretrial publicity and the particular degree to which it
has circulated in the community, (2) the connection of government officials
with the release of the publicity, (3) the length of time between the dissemi-
nation of the publicity and the trial, (4) the severity and notoriety of the
offense, (5) the area from which the jury is to be drawn, (6) other events
occurring in the community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the
community or individual jurors toward the defendant, and (7) any factors
likely to affect the candor and veracity of the prospective jurors on voir dire."
315 So. 2d at 311.
49. 315 So. 2d at 311.
50. Id.
51. "The questioning was directed solely at the issue of whether the
person could serve as an impartial juror or would be subject to challenge for
cause at the defendant's trial." Id. at 312.
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its refusal to permit defendants to offer other evidence in an
effort to prove community bias.52 The court's analysis of the
purport of article 622 is clear and direct. The concept of chal-
lenge for cause cannot be confused with the concept of change
of venue, as the redactor's comments show. The language of
article 622 reveals that "the defendants were entitled to a
change of venue if they could show, even though it would be
possible to select a jury whose numbers were not subject to a
challenge for cause, that there were influences in the com-
munity which would affect the answers of the jurors on voir
dire, or the testimony of witnesses at the trial, or that, for
any other reason, a fair and impartial trial could not be ob-
tained in the parish."
The majority's position is certainly consistent with the
spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the handling
of such problems by the United States Supreme Court. For
example, in Rideau v. Louisiana,53 the Court, after discussing
massive pretrial publicity, said that it would not "hesitate to
hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript
of the voir dire examination of members of the jury, that due
process of law in [that] case required a trial before a jury
drawn from a community of people who had not seen and
heard Rideau's televised interview." 54
Needless to say, the expenditure of time and funds con-
cluding in a jury verdict which must be reversed on appeal
presents an unhappy picture.55 As stated, however, the
court's position is both just and sound. It is unfortunate that
the defendant's pretrial application for writs was not
granted.5 6 While piecemeal litigation of a case is not to be
desired, in cases of such magnitude when fundamental is-
sues 57 are involved, the court would serve the interest of
52. On this point the majority and dissent appear divided on the in-
terpretation of the record of the trial proceedings. The writer's commentary
is based on the majority's findings.
53. 373 U.S. 723 (1963). The defendant's confession was televised follow-
ing a highly publicized robbery-murder in Lake Charles, La.
54. Id. at 729. In the televised interview, the defendant confessed to the
sheriff the murders for which he was subsequently tried and convicted. Id.
55. Both deputies who lost their lives were and several of the officers
who were injured severely are friends of the writer.
56. State v. Bell, 274 So. 2d 392 (La. 1973).
57. The merits of none of the other ninety-nine bills of exceptions urged
on appeal were discussed.
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justice to both the state and the defendant in granting pre-
trial review. 58
THE JURY
Jury Venires-The Reaction to Taylor
The Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to apply the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daniel v.
Louisiana5 9 and Taylor v. Louisiana6" in several cases during
the last term. Taylor, decided on January 21, 1975, held that
the provisions of Art. VII, § 41 of the Louisiana Constitution
of 192161 and article 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
providing for the automatic exemption of women from jury
service 62 were unconstitutional. 63 Six days later, on January
27, 1975, in Daniel, the Court held that Taylor "is not to be
applied retroactively, as a matter of federal law, to convic-
tions obtained by juries empanelled prior to the date of that
58. See, e.g., State v. Truss, 317 So. 2d 177 (La. 1975) (trial court's "palpa-
ble error" in denying defendant's motion to suppress reviewed and reversed
following the defendant's pretrial application for writs). If the court considers
the error to be obvious, as in Truss, the fairest step to take is to grant relief
in an exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Donahue,
315 So. 2d 329 (La. 1975), where the defendant moved to recuse (LA. CODE
CRIM. P. arts. 680-81) the district attorney and his assistants because the
district attorney himself was to be the state's "sole witness to the content of
an oral confession" made by the defendant. The defendant's application for
writs was granted and the district attorney was ordered recused from the
case. See, e.g., State v. Birabent, 305 So. 2d 448 (La. 1974). Cf. LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 2083; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 300 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
59. 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
60. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
61. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which does not contain a similar
provision exempting women from jury duty, explicitly repeals La. Const. art.
VII, § 41 (1921) and became effective at midnight December 31, 1974. See LA.
CONST. art. XIV, §§ 317 & 350. See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 33.
62. They were exempt unless they filed a written declaration of desire to
serve with the clerk of court. See also former LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 402,
repealed by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess. No. 20 § 1 effective Jan. 1, 1975.
63. In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that "Louisiana's
special exemption for women operates to exclude them from petit juries,
which in our view is contrary to the sixth and fourteenth amendments." 419
U.S. at 538. To provide such a broad exemption in effect defeats the require-
ment that the pool from which trial jurors are ultimately selected represent a
"fair cross section of the community." See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 492 (1972);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
decision. ' 64 Since the question of retroactivity was one of
tremendous consequence to Louisiana,65 Daniel told the full
story in terms of the impact of Taylor on the Louisiana crimi-
nal justice system. Had Taylor been given retroactive effect,
the federal and state district courts would have been filled
with petitions for writs of habeas corpus from those who
raised the issue and had it adversely decided as well as from
those whose counsel failed to raise it.66 Since almost every
Louisiana inmate was convicted following trial before a jury
constituted in compliance with Louisiana Constitution Art.
VII, § 41,67 Daniel was far more significant in easing the
impact of Taylor, than Taylor was in changing the law in
Louisiana. 68
Following Taylor and Daniel, the Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected claims attacking the constitutionality of ve-
nires in cases where trials were held prior to January 21,
1975. The court rejected the contention that cases in the
"appellate pipeline" 69 should give Taylor full prospective ap-
plication. 70 Justice Dixon, in State v. Rester,7 1 said:
Opinions concerning retroactive or prospective applica-
tion of new-found constitutional rights are not good sub-
jects for careful analysis. They tend only to the conclu-
sion that these results are dictated less by law and reason
than by expedient judicial administration.72
64. 420 U.S. at 32.
65. The issue was hotly litigated in Louisiana for several years prior to
Taylor. The question was presented, but not decided, in Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. Had Taylor been given retroactive impact, innumerable problems of
"waiver by counsel's procedural default" would have been spawned. See
Tollette v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S.
233 (1973); Rivera v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1974); Winters v. Cook,
466 F.2d 1393, on rehearing 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
67. Cf. State v. Kibby, 294 So. 2d 196 (La. 1974).
68. The United States Supreme Court was, of course, aware of Louisi-
ana's own changes. The invalid provisions themselves were repealed as a
matter of state law approximately twenty-one days prior to the decision in
Taylor.
69. State v. Milton, 310 So. 2d 524, 526 (La. 1975); State v. Rester, 309 So.
2d 321, 325 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., State v. Nicholas, 312 So. 2d 856 (La. 1975); State v. Devore,
309 So. 2d 325 (La. 1975); State v. Rester, 309 So. 2d 321 (La. 1975). See also
State v. Wright, 316 So. 2d 380 (La. 1975); State v. Groves, 311 So. 2d 230 (La.
1975).
71. 309 So. 2d 321 (La. 1975).
72. Id. at 323. The basis for the decision to give non-retroactive effect to
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While the writer agrees with the court's prospective ap-
plication of Taylor, the court had no choice in view of Daniel.
As a matter of "federal law," Daniel said Taylor was not
retroactive. 73 The Louisiana Supreme Court is bound by the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal con-
stitutional law.74 For the Louisiana Supreme Court to have
given Taylor retroactive effect, it would have to have done so
based on state law, and state law was clear in view of the
constitutional provision.
An interesting series of cases from the Eighteenth Judi-
cial District of Louisiana has provided a fascinating problem
in view of the non-retroactive application of Taylor. Prior to
the decision in Taylor, women in that district were being
included in petit jury venires. 75 In State v. Milton,76 the de-
fendant moved to quash7 7 on the grounds that the inclusion
of women who did not file the written declaration of willing-
ness to serve violated Art. VII, § 41 of the then applicable
Louisiana constitution as well as the former Code of Criminal
Procedure article 402 which merely restated the applicable
provisions.
Affirming the conviction, the court said that although
Daniel held that Taylor "need not be applied retroactively,"7 8
Daniel was predicated on the theory that retroactive applica-
tion of Taylor "would do little, if anything, to vindicate the
sixth amendment interest at stake and would have a substan-
tial impact on the administration of criminal justice in Loui-
siana. ' ' 79 The court said that Daniel did not indicate that the
constitutional provision was valid when the defendant chal-
lenged the venire in Milton. The trial judge was therefore
Taylor was predicated on the United States Supreme Court's earlier cases
regarding retroactive application of new constitutional rules. See Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
73. See note 68, supra.
74. See, e.g., State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975).
75. Following Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), some
judges concluded, as did the federal district court in Healy, that LA. CONST.
art. VII, § 41 (1921), was unconstitutional. They thus began to include women
in petit jury venires. See State v. Kibby, 294 So. 2d 196 (La. 1974).
76. 310 So. 2d 524 (La. 1975).
77. The motion was filed prior to trial. The motion was denied on Sept. 23,
1974 and the defendant was tried on October 2, 1974, several months prior to
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (Jan. 21, 1975) or the effective date of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 (midnight, Dec. 31, 1974).
78. State v. Milton, 310 So. 2d 524, 526 (La. 1975).
79. 420 U.S. at 31.
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correct in permitting the "inclusion of non-volunteering
women."' 0
The court's approach to the problem is sound. The valid-
ity of the Louisiana constitutional and statutory scheme was
not at issue in Daniel. The scheme was constitutionally in-
valid and the trial court in Milton correctly foresaw that
result.
Jury Access to Testimony and Documents
State v. Freetime8 l and State v. McCulley8 2 concerned the
application of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
793.83 In Freetime, the trial court acquiesced to a jury's re-
quest to inspect the defendant's written confession during its
deliberations. In McCulley, the trial court permitted the jury
during deliberation to replay the record of the testimony of a
crucial state witness.8
In both cases the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the prohibition of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure article represented a clear legislative choice not to per-
mit jury access to such evidence during deliberations. Despite
a contrary position taken by the American Bar Association,8 5
the court felt bound to enforce the clearly expressed legisla-
tive mandate of article 793.
In both Freetime and McCulley, Justice Tate, writing for
the court, rejected the state's harmless error argument. Ear-
lier, in State v. Ledet,8 6 a case involving reference by a juror
to notes, Justice Tate predicated his opinion on the theory of
harmless error and noted with approval the ABA's position,87
80. 310 So. 2d at 526. Justices Barham and Summer dissented.
81. 303 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974).
82. 310 So. 2d 833 (La. 1975).
83. In State v. Ledet, 298 So. 2d 761 (La. 1974), the court also interpreted
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 793. Since the result there involved the application of
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921, the case is treated separately in this symposium.
84. The testimony replayed was that of an undercover police officer
whose testimony, along with that of another undercover officer, formed the
"principal evidence of [drug] possession presented against the defendant."
310 So. 2d at 834 n.1.
85. ABA STANDARDS, Trial by Jury §§ 4.2, 5.1, 5.2 (1968).
86. 298 So. 2d 761 (La. 1974). This case involved note-taking by jurors and
reference to notes during deliberations. This is also prohibited by LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 793.
87. ABA STANDARDS, Trial by Jury § 4.2 (1968). Justice Tate was also
concerned with enforcing the policy expressed in LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950)
prohibiting juror impeachment of their verdict.
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which was contrary to article 793. Despite the court's aware-
ness that many academicians and practicing lawyers feel that
jurors should, in the trial court's discretion, be permitted to
replay testimony or refer to documentary evidence, it refused
to ignore Louisiana's clear "policy choice."8 8
In Freetime, the state urged the court to give the jury
"sole discretion to determine whether physical examination is
required by it of any documentary exhibit." 89 Article 793
permits the jury to examine documentary exhibits when a
"physical examination thereof is required to enable the jury
to arrive at a verdict." This does not include an examination
of a "documentary exhibit for its verbal content."90
The interpretation urged by the state would have opened
the door to examination of documents for their verbal con-
tents. The trial court should certainly be given some discre-
tion to determine whether the jury seeks the document for
"physical examination" or examination of its verbal contents.
However, if the purpose of the jury view of the document
could only be, from the nature of the exhibit, to re-examine its
verbal content, examination seems to fly in the face of the
code article's clear proscription. Change in this area must
come by legislative action,91 and not by a liberal application of
the harmless error rule.92
Jury Charges
In State v. Nicholson,93 the Louisiana Supreme Court dis-
approved of "Allen charges" to encourage deadlocked juries
to reach a verdict. The court instead approved charges which
comply with the American Bar Association Standards Relat-
ing to Trial by Jury.9 4 This is not to say that the court has
strictly disavowed jury charges that encourage jurors to re-
examine their views in order to reach a verdict. The ABA
88. 310 So. 2d at 835, 303 So. 2d at 490.
89. 303 So. 2d at 489.
90. Id., citing State v. Arnaudville, 170 La. 151, 127 So. 395 (1930), and
State v. Harrison, 149 La. 83, 88 So. 696 (1921). See also La. Acts 1928, No. 2
§ 1, art. 395.
91. The legislature meets in regular session every year. LA. CONST. art.
III, § 2.
92. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921.
93. 315 So. 2d 639 (La. 1975).
94. ABA STANDARDS, Trial by Jury § 5.4 (1968). The court notes that an
appropriate modification to (i) would of course be made in cases not requiring
a unanimous verdict. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 779, 782.
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Standards certainly approve some such charges. The court
was simply concerned with a portion of the trial court's
charge that indicated that the case would "definitely have to
be tried again"95 in the event of mistrial following failure to
reach a verdict. The court also disapproved of the trial judge's
emphasis on "the desirability of reaching a verdict."96
The court has essentially promulgated the ABA Stan-
dards as guidelines to any supplemental charges given to
juries having difficulty reaching verdicts. Hence, to the ex-
tent that those guidelines9 7 are carefully followed, trial courts
may give jurors supplemental charges to aid a deadlocked
jury in reaching a verdict.
In State v. Babin,98 on rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the defendant was entitled to have the jury
charged on "the consequence of a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity-the procedural aftermath of such
finding."9 9 The court, recognizing the res nova nature of the
issue, declined to follow State v. Blackwell,"00 holding that
"instructions on the post verdict status of a not guilty by
reason of insanity acquittal are not properly analogous to
instructions on post conviction sentencing."'' 1 In Blackwell,
95. 315 So. 2d at 641.
96. Id. at 642.
97. ABA STANDARDS, Trial by Jury § 5.4 (1968): "(a) Before the jury
retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the
jury: (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii)
that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to indi-
vidual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to
reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous;
and (v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. (b) If it appears to the court that
the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue
their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in
subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it
appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement."
98. 319 So. 2d 367 (La. 1975).
99. Id. at 367.
100. 298 So. 2d 798 (La. 1974). See The Work of the Appellate Courts for the
1972-1978 Term-Criminal Procedure II, 35 LA. L. REV. 493 (1974).
101. 298 So. 2d at 800. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 654-55, 657.
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the court left the question of charging the jury as to the
penalty in non-capital cases to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Babin,0 2 however, clearly requires instructions
regarding the procedures to be followed following a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity "if they have been specially
requested by defendant or by the jurors."'0 3
In holding that Code of Criminal Procedure article 803
requires the special charge, the court recognized that it was
making a "judicial choice between a possible miscarriage of
justice flowing from the imprisonment of one who should be
hospitalized, because the jury does not understand the effects
of its insanity verdict, and a possible invitation to the jury to
consider matters extraneous to the merits ... ."4 The choice
in favor of requiring the charge, while inconsistent with
Blackwell, is nonetheless fair and just.
HARMLESS ERROR
State v. Sneed'0 5 again applies harmless error in a case
involving the notice of intention to introduce inculpatory
statements required by Code of Criminal Procedure article
768. The 768 notice requirement has provided a fertile field for
harmless error. 0 6 While the code requirement is rather clear
and direct, the court has had no difficulty avoiding reversal
for noncompliance with its mandate. Numerous exceptions
have been recognized so that the type of statements covered
by article 768 has been rather narrowly drawn.10 7
In Sneed, the court announced what appeared to be a
significant rule regarding the contents of the required notice,
then concluded that the state's failure to comply with the
102. 318 So. 2d at 367.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 316 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975).
106. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 260 La. 561, 256 So. 2d 627 (1972); State v.
LaCoste, 256 La. 697, 237 So. 2d 871 (1970).
107. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 306 So. 2d 695 (La. 1975) (LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 768 only deals with statements made after the crime was committed);
State v. Normand, 298 So. 2d 823 (La. 1974) (disclosing notice of intent to use
confession in bill of particulars sufficient); State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So.
2d 670 (1972) (not required in a bench trial); State v. Jackson, 260 La. 561, 256
So. 2d 627 (1972) (where failure to give is inadvertent and in good faith and
not to the detriment of defendant no harm from failure to give); State v.
Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So. 2d 360 (1970) (not applicable to statements made
during the "res gestae" of the offense).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
heretofore unrecognized standard was harmless error. In
order to be "technically sufficient,"'10 8 the 768 notice must, it
said, identify each confession or inculpatory statement "with
sufficient specificity as to date or occasion and as to persons
to whom give[n] as to afford adequate notice sufficient to
permit the defendant a fair opportunity to meet the issue."'10 9
Although a notice is "technically insufficient," 110 no revers-
ible error results when the accused is in fact given sufficient
pre-trial notice. 1' As examples the court referred to earlier
cases in which the defendant was informed of the state's
intent to use an inculpatory statement by letter or by re-
sponse to a bill of particulars. 112
Sneed is consistent with the court's earlier harmless error
approach to article 768. If complete lack of notice does not bar
admission absent prejudicial surprise, 1 3 a fortiori the same
result should follow if no prejudicial surprise results from
giving a technically insufficient notice.
The court's approach in Sneed is well reasoned and fair,
although, as Justice Dixon notes, the article 768 notice is
"virtually useless in the defense of criminal cases"" 4 and is
"honored more in the breach than in the enforcement.""15
Article 768 provides little in the way of discovery for the
defense;" 6 as Justice Tate recognized the district attorneys
108. Justice Tate refers to the technical sufficiency and insufficiency of
the notice throughout the opinion.
109. 316 So. 2d at 376. The court reiterated its earlier position that the
768 notice need not give the content of the statement. See State v. Richey,
258 La. 1094, 249 So. 2d 143 (1971).
110. 316 So. 2d at 377.
111. In Sneed, in response to a prayer for oyer the DA agreed to furnish
defense counsel with all oral statements of the defendant. 316 So. 2d at 377.
Presumably this information was furnished.
112. See State v. Normand, 298 So. 2d 823 (La. 1974); State v. Brumfield,
263 La. 147, 267 So. 2d 553 (1972).
113. See State v. LaCoste, 256 La. 697, 237 So. 2d 871 (1970).
114. 316 So. 2d at 380.
115. Id. Several months later in State v. Dupuy, 318 So. 2d 294 (1975)
Justice Dixon, referring to Sneed and finding harmless error, wrote: "We did
not there [in Sneed] hold that the 'bare bones notice,' like the one used in this
case.., was such a violation of the codal requirement that it would, without
any showing prejudice, require reversal." 318 So. 2d at 297.
116. A recent amendment of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 requires the government
to disclose, upon request, to the defendant "the substance of any oral state-
ment which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by
the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by
any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent."
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 621
may wait until immediately prior to the beginning of the
state's opening statement to give notice. 117 He notes that "the
purposes of the provision might better be served by notice
more in advance of the trial date than the opening morning of
the trial."1 8
But because more advance notice is not required by the
statute, it is easy to see why the court treats a technically
insufficient article 768 notice as harmless error if it has been
preceeded by advance information. The court seems to imply
that when the defendant gets more than he is entitled to
under article 768, violations of that code provision will likely
be deemed harmless error.11 9
WITNESSES
Sequestration
State v. Bradford1 20 addresses the trial court's authority
to prohibit a witness from testifying as a sanction for viola-
tion of a sequestration order. 121 In that case, a state witness
discussed the case with a district attorney's investigator after
the sequestration order.122 Defense counsel argued that Loui-
siana Code of Criminal Procedure article 764 permits only the
district attorney or one of his assistants to discuss the case
with prospective witnesses after the sequestration order. The
trial judge permitted the state witness to testify. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in permitting the witness to testify. The court as-
sumed for purposes of the decision that the investigator's
conversation with the witness violated the order. It noted
that the witness was the first to be called by the district
attorney, that the investigator was not a witness in the case,
and that the discussion occurred prior to the testimony of any
witnesses. 23 Under the circumstances, the court said, the
witness was "not being informed of events and testimony
117. 316 So. 2d at 377 n.2.
118. Id.
119. See also State v. Wright, 316 So. 2d 380 (La. 1975) (decided the same
day as Sneed).
120. 298 So. 2d 781 (La. 1974).
121. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 764.
122. An order of sequestration had been given. See 298 So. 2d at 789 for
the judge's instructions to the prospective witnesses.
123. 298 So. 2d at 793.
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occurring within the courtroom. ' 124 Finding that the "pri-
mary purpose of sequestration ... is to insure that a witness
will testify as to his own knowledge of the case without being
influenced by the testimony of other witnesses," 125 the court
concluded that the trial court properly permitted the witness
to testify.
The court did not discuss its earlier decision in State v.
Wills,126 in which a policeman was sent by the district attor-
ney to speak with defense witnesses after the sequestration
order. There reversing, the court spoke in terms of the defen-
dant's "statutory right to have his witnesses secured from
police interrogation.' ' 27 It clearly rejected the district attor-
ney's contention that the police were his "investigatory
arm"1 28 and should be able to act for him in speaking to
witnesses after a sequestration order has been entered.
When the district attorney's investigator is not a witness
in the case, the trial court should have authority to modify its
sequestration order, upon request of the district attorney, to
permit the investigator to interview witnesses for the district
attorney. Article 764 permits the trial court to "modify its
order in the interest of justice." The modification could be
accompanied by appropriate safeguards. It could be limited to
the state's witnesses, excluding the right to interrogate or
interview defense witnesses. The trial court could also in-
struct the investigator not to inform witnesses of the tes-
timony of other witnesses. Such safeguards could prevent
abuse while permitting the investigator to aid a district at-
torney who, for example, may have to select a jury while his
investigator goes over prior statements with state witnesses.
In State v. Holmes,129 the trial court prohibited the tes-
timony of a defense witness because she was present during
the entire trial in violation of the sequestration rule. 130 The
witness precluded from giving testimony was to testify in
support of the defendant's alibi. She heard the entire tes-
124. Id. at 790.
125. Id.
126. 260 La. 707, 257 So. 2d 378 (1972).
127. Id. at 708, 257 So. 2d at 379. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 764 permits
counsel to speak to witnesses after the order sequestering the witnesses has
been entered.
128. 260 La. at 708, 257 So. 2d at 379.
129. 305 So. 2d 409 (La. 1974).
130. Id. at 410.
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timony and cross-examination of another alibi witness.
Affirming, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that "to have
allowed [the witness] to testify would have violated the very
reason for the sequestration of witnesses."'131 The court cited
earlier cases1 32 interpreting article 764 as permitting the trial
court "the discretion to prohibit a witness who has violated
the sequestration order from testifying. '133
Certainly the trial judge, given proper circumstances, can
prohibit a witness who has violated the sequestration order
from testifying. 34 But the defendant's constitutional right to
present witness in his own behalf' 35 must be balanced against
the trial court's enforcement of its order of sequestration.
Recently the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit granted a new trial in collateral proceedings review-
ing a Louisiana conviction. In State v. Barnard,3 6 the Louisi-
ana trial judge had refused to permit the defense to call a
witness who the district attorney contended violated the
sequestration order. The witness was not present during the
first day of the proceedings and was unaware of the order,
invoked on behalf of the defendant. The witness entered the
courtroom and heard about fifteen minutes of testimony of a
state witness before a recess when the witness's presence was
discovered. The Louisiana Supreme Court1 3 7 apparently ap-
proved the trial court's ruling that it was the responsibility of
counsel to notify his witnesses of the sequestration rule. 3 8
Since the witness's testimony would directly contradict the
131. Id. at 413. The court said: "The purpose behind the order of seques-
tration is to encourage development of the true facts of the case by prevent-
ing witnesses from being influenced by the testimony of other witnesses and
by allowing for effective cross-examination." Id.
132. State v. Edwards, 257 La. 707, 243 So. 2d 806 (1971); State v. Rouse,
256 La. 275, 236 So. 2d 211 (1970); State v. Coleman, 254 La. 264, 223 So. 2d 402
(1969).
133. 305 So. 2d at 413.
134. An argument could be made based on the difference between LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 764 and La. Acts 1928, No. 2. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
764, comment 1(b). See also State v. Bernard, 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
136. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
137. The opinion was authored by William A. Culpepper, Justice Ad Hoc,
and subscribed to by two regular members of the court. There were two
dissents.
138. The Louisiana Supreme Court also found the error, if any, harmless
in view of the testimony of another defense witness who did testify at the
trial.
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testimony of the other witness whom she heard, the court
approved the disallowance of the testimony.13 9
In ordering a new trial, the Fifth Circuit indicated that
the trial court may only exclude crucial defense witnesses
from testifying when the sequestration violation was with the
"knowledge, procurement, or consent" of the defendant or his
counsel.140 The test applied by the Fifth Circuit is, of course,
based on federal constitutional grounds. It would also appear
to satisfy the defendant's Louisiana constitutional right to
call witnesses on his own behalf.'4 1 Although the decision in
Holmes might pass the constitutional test outlined by the
Fifth Circuit, the decision of the court does not address the
problem in those terms. Given the availability of collateral
review of state convictions by lower federal courts,' 42 the
tests employed by those courts in applying federal constitu-
tional standards must at least be recognized and discussed by
Louisiana courts.
Questioning by the Trial Court
In two recent cases the Louisiana Supreme Court ap-
proved the trial court judge's examination of witnesses. In
State v. Layssard, 4 3 a bench trial, although the judge did not
put the questions directly to the witness, he instructed the
district attorney to ask certain questions. 144 In State v.
Groves, 45 a jury trial, the judge asked five questions of a
state witness in the presence of the jury. The questions dealt
with whether the deceased committed an "overt act" or "hos-
tile demonstration" prior to being killed. 4 6
139. 287 So. 2d at 775.
140. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1975), citing Bras-
well v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972) (containing a full discussion
of what the court in Barnard calls the "Braswell test" for determining
whether, without violating the constitutional rights of the defendant, a de-
fense witness can be barred from giving testimony due to his violation of a
sequestration order).
141. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
143. 310 So. 2d 107 (La. 1975).
144. They dealt with laying the foundation for the admission of evidence
of the witness' conclusion that the defendant, charged with DWI, was drunk
at the time of his arrest. In the court's view, telling the DA what to ask and
asking the questions himself was no different. 310 So. 2d at 109. The witness
was apparently a state trooper.
145. 311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975).
146. See LA. R.S. 15:482 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 239.
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In both cases, relying on prior jurisprudence,1 4 7 the court
suggested that trial judges may question witnesses in order
to clarify the witnesses' testimony or to "supply an omission
of proof on a material point.' 14 In bench trials the trial judge
may question witnesses to clarify the evidence in his mind.14 9
In jury trials, the trial judge must avoid questions which
comment on the evidence' 50 or indicate "his opinion on the
merits" or express "any doubt as to the credibility of the
witness." 5'
In Layssard the trial court is given broad latitude to
question witnesses in bench trials:
Unless [the trial court's] participation in the trial is to
such an extent and of such a nature that it deprives the
defendant of a fair trial, there is no error. 52
It seems, under the quoted test, that the trial court must
practically assume the role of prosecutor 153 in order to commit
error in questioning witnesses.
Similarly, under the test approved in Groves for jury
trials,154 the trial judge has broad latitude. Although he must
not appear through his questions to take sides, 155 the fact
that his questions clarify testimony or supply elements,
thereby in effect aiding either the prosecution or the defense,
is of no moment.
The court's analysis fits very nicely with the theory that
the trial judge is not merely an umpire or referee of a purely
adversary process. It also conforms nicely to the theory that
the trial court has a duty to aid in the development of facts so
that the jury can reach the truth. 56 However, trial judges
147. State v. Coffil, 222 La. 487, 62 So. 2d 651 (1952); State v. Wilson, 204
La. 24, 14 So. 2d 873 (1943); State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So. 2d 249 (1943).
148. 311 So. 2d at 240.
149. 310 So. 2d at 108.
150. Id. See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 772.
151. 311 So. 2d at 240.
152. 310 So. 2d at 108.
153. See Fequeroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1pt Cir. 1966).
154. See text at notes 149-51, supra.
155. The same guidelines appear applicable to federal district judges. For
an interesting example of a trial court's improper "cross-examination" of'a
testifying defendant in a federal criminal prosecution for importation of
marijuana, see United States v. Hokey, 483 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1973).
156. See United States v. Hokey, 483 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Lewis, 338 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1964); Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d
265 (8th Cir. 1964); Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945).
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must use restraint and must not ignore the adversary nature
of the process. It is the district attorney's responsibility, not
the court's, to see that the state's case is established beyond a
reasonable doubt. That burden of proof falls on the state.157
CONTROLLING THE OBSTREPEROUS DEFENDANT
In State v. Brewer 1 5 s the trial court ordered the defen-
dants, Brewer and Wilkinson, bound and gagged in the pres-
ence of the jury. On appeal, in Brewer's case the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed; in Wilkinson's, it reversed. The dif-
ference in results stemmed directly from the difference in the
two defendants' conduct preceding the trial court's order
that they be bound and gagged. 159
The court recognized the trial judge's authority under
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 17160 to take
such action when the defendant has "made clear his intention
to disrupt the court and his disrespect for the proceedings.''
By implication, in reversing Wilkinson's conviction, the court
also made it clear that such action will not be approved unless
the record supports the trial court's finding that the defen-
dant was sufficiently disruptive to warrant the measures.
The court relied upon Illinois v. Allen, 162 a United States
Supreme Court decision recognizing the authority of a trial
judge to bind and gag a disruptive defendant or even exclude
him from the courtroom, under certain conditions. 16 3 There
the Court found extreme conduct, repeated warnings of the
consequences of continued misbehavior, and an invitation to
return on the defendant's agreement to behave in an orderly
fashion. 6 4
The test is the same for binding and gagging, as in Brew-
157. LA. R.S. 15:271 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1966, No. 311, § 2 and
La. Acts 1968, No. 150, § 1. See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 804.
158. 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974).
159. A full colloquy of the proceedings is reported. 301 So. 2d at 634.
160. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 17 provides: "[The court] has the duty to
require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an
orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that justice
is done ......
161. 301 So. 2d at 635.
162. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
163. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the defendant's exclusion
from the courtroom was upheld.
164. 397 U.S. at 346.
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er, and exclusion, as in Allen.16 5 Once it is satisfied, the trial
court should determine which course to follow. Arguably, if
the defendant is accused of a capital crime, binding and gag-
ging is the only option available to the court, since the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides a strong mandate for the defen-
dant's presence in capital cases. 6 6 Nevertheless, for such ex-
treme measures to be justified, more than a minor disruption
must occur.167 In view of Allen, trial judges would be advised
to warn the defendant, for the record, prior to such measures,
regarding the consequences of further disruption. In this
manner, the trial court provides a clear, unequivocal record
on which the reviewing court can evaluate the justification
for the action taken.
MISTRIAL
Prejudicial Remarks by the District Attorney
In State v. Gaspard16 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court's refusal to order a mistrial following
the prosecutor's reference to plea bargaining arrangements
between the defendant and the state. The court found that
the remark fell outside the scope of Louisiana Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure article 770, but that an admonition to disregard
it was not enough to cure the prejudicial impact and to "as-
sure the defendant a fair trial."' 69 Although article 770 did
not require a mistrial in this situation, the court recognized
that there are situations other than those listed in article 770
requiring the granting of a mistrial. 170 When a remark by the
165. Id.
166. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 831 provides: "A defendant charged with a
felony shall be present: (1) At arraignment; (2) When a plea of guilty, not
guilty, or not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity is made; (3) At the
calling, examination, challenging, impanelling, and swearing of the jury, and
at any subsequent proceedings for the discharge of the jury or of a juror; (4)
At all times during the trial when the court is determining and ruling on the
admissibility of evidence; (5) In trials by jury, at all proceedings when the
jury is present, and in trials without a jury, at all times when evidence is
being adduced; and (6) At the rendition of the verdict or judgment, unless he
voluntarily absents himself."
167. The contempt power may be sufficient to control disruptive behavior
of a lesser nature. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 17, 21-22, 25.
168. 301 So. 2d 344 (La. 1974).
169. Id. at 356.
170. Id.
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district attorney is not within the scope of article 770, mistrial
is unnecessary only if the admonition will suffice to allay
prejudice. Although article 771 speaks in terms of the trial
court's discretion to grant a mistrial "if it is satisfied that an
admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair
trial,"'171 Gaspard makes it clear, by implication, that the code
article requires the granting of a mistrial unless the trial
court's admonition is sufficient to assure the defendant a fair
trial.
The court's analysis is correct. Article 770 lists grounds
for mandatory mistrial in which the legislature has deter-
mined that admonition will never suffice unless the defendant
waives his right to a mistrial. Article 771, on the other hand,
lists those sorts of prejudicial remarks that may, but do not
always, require a mistrial on defendant's motion. In the event
that the court finds that the improper remarks could not
reasonably be cured by admonition, a new trial must be or-
dered. In such cases, the trial court's discretion to rely on an
admonition is still subject to review.
Remarks by Police Witnesses
A series of cases have dealt with the perennial problem of
references by police witnesses to inadmissible evidence of
other crimes. 172 The Louisiana Supreme Court has not aban-
doned the theory that such a reference by an officer not
"obtained by design of the prosecutor"'173 does not fall within
the scope of article 770.174 Such remarks by officers are im-
proper but do not require mistrial if the trial court is satisfied
that an admonition to the jury to disregard them will suffice
"to assure the defendant a fair trial."'175
In State v. Foss,1 76 Justice Barham1 7 7 warned prosecutors
171. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 771.
172. State v. Lepkowski, 316 So. 2d 727 (La. 1975); State v. Lewis, 315 So.
2d 626 (La. 1975); State v. Smith, 310 So. 2d 580 (La. 1975); State v. Foss, 310
So. 2d 573 (La. 1975); State v. Gabriel, 308 So. 2d 746 (La. 1975); State v.
Johnson, 306 So. 2d 724 (La. 1975); State v. Jackson, 301 So. 2d 598 (La. 1974).
173. State v. Lepkowski, 316 So. 2d 727, 729 (La. 1975).
174. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770 mandates a mistrial if requested by the
defendant if the district attorney or the judge or a "court official" refers
directly or indirectly to evidence of other offenses committed by the defen-
dant as to which evidence is not admissible.
175. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 771.
176. 310 So. 2d 573 (La. 1975).
177. His opinion was signed by Justice Tate. Justices Calogero and Dixon
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that the court was growing "increasingly suspicious"' 7 8 of
police officers who, while testifying, "seemingly explode with
nonresponsive, inadmissible remarks of great prejudice when
asked innocent questions by the State and the defense.' 1 79 In
Foss, a narcotics case, in response to a question posed by
defense counsel during cross-examination, the officer labeled
the defendant as the "King pin" of a burglary organization. 8 0
Reversing the conviction, the court said that "when gratui-
tous information supplied by a witness effectively jeopardizes
the defendant's due process right to a fair trial,"'' the trial
court must grant a mistrial. Under the circumstances, Justice
Barham found that the admonition was insufficient "to to-
tally cure the prejudice" and that the circumstances were
such that a mistrial alone would "preserve the defendant's
right to a fair trial."' 82
In State v. Smith,183 decided the same day as Foss, the
court affirmed the trial court's denial of a mistrial where a
police officer mentioned an unrelated narcotics sale. 8 4 The
officer was responding to defense cross-examination. 1' The
trial court, admonishing the jury to disregard the remarks,
refused to order a mistrial. Following its earlier cases, the
court found that the trial court was within the scope of dis-
cretion provided by article 771. It said that the remark in
question was not "clearly unresponsive" due to the "in-
definiteness" of defense counsel's question. 116 The court also
found no indication that the prosecution participated in plan-
ning the reference to inadmissible evidence by the officer. 8 7
In both Foss and Smith, the court toys with the idea,
concurred in the reversal of the conviction but disagreed "from the opinion as
written." 310 So. 2d at 578. They found reversible error on other grounds.
Justices Sanders, Summers, and Marcus dissented.
178. 310 So. 2d at 577.
179. Id.
180. The question was: "How long out of the ten minutes did you talk [to
the defendant Foss]?" 310 So. 2d at 574.
181. Id. at 577.
182. Id.
183. 310 So. 2d 580 (La. 1975).
184. The defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin. The reference
was to an unrelated sale. The state apparently did not argue that evidence of
the unrelated sale was admissible under State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La.
1973).




expressed by Justice Barham's dissent in State v. Johnson,188
that "prejudicial injection of inadmissible evidence by a law
enforcement officer"18 9 testifying as a state witness should be
considered prejudicial action by the state presumably within
the scope of the mandatory mistrial provisions of article
770.190 In both cases, however, the court specifically notes
that the decisions did not reach that issue.
A later case indicates that the court has not abandoned
its earlier position and will not adopt Justice Barham's
suggestion in Johnson. In State v. Lepkowski, 191 the court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a defense motion for
a mistrial following an officer's reference to inadmissible evi-
dence of another offense. In response to a question by the
district attorney, the officer said he learned that the defen-
dant had a "previous conviction. ' 192 The court found that the
district attorney's question was not designed to place inad-
missible evidence 193 before a jury. It held that the trial
court's admonition to disregard the remark was sufficient.
Similarly, in State v. Lewis, 194 also decided after Smith
and Foss, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant
a mistrial based on a police officer's remark. Following the
officer's testimony concerning the defendant's confession of
the offense charged, the officer said that the defendant told
him "he wanted to tell . . . about some other things he had
done. '195 Though the court said the remark did not necessar-
ily imply that the defendant had referred to other crimes,
that determination was not crucial to the decision. The court
found the remark to be an "inadvertent reference . . . not
chargeable to the State.' 196 The admonition to the jury to
disregard the remark was sufficient.
No inference of change in approach may be drawn from
the court's recent decisions regarding unresponsive answers
188. 306 So. 2d 724, 731 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissenting).
189. State v. Smith, 310 So. 2d 580, 581 (La. 1975); State v. Foss, 310 So. 2d
573, 578 (La. 1975).
190. Id.
191. 316 So. 2d 727 (La. 1975). Justice Dixon wrote the court's opinion.
192. Id. at 728.
193. Id. at 729. The prosecutor's lack of design was not contested by
defense counsel. The trial court similarly found no improper design on the
prosecutor's part.
194. 315 So. 2d 626 (La. 1975).
195. Id. at 630.
196. Id.
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by police witnesses that effectively put inadmissible evidence
of other offenses before the jury. Several members of the
court have expressed a wary attitude toward police officers
who seem to seize the opportunity during cross-examination
to make damaging remarks about the defendant. However, if
there ever was a temptation on the part of a majority of the
court to place prejudicial remarks made by police witnesses
within the scope of the mandatory mistrial provisions of arti-
cle 770,197 it has passed.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Re-prosecution Following Mistrial
In State v. Birabent,19 the Louisiana Supreme Court de-
cided that the defendant's second prosecution following a
mistrial violated the statutory provisions1 99 regarding double
jeopardy, thereby avoiding a very interesting federal con-
stitutional problem. The mistrial ending the first trial was
declared on motion of the district attorney after the first
witness was sworn,20 0 when the district attorney realized,
following a defense motion,2 1 that the indictment charged
the defendant with manslaughter, not murder.20 2 The trial
court denied the district attorney's motion to amend the in-
dictment to charge the defendant with murder 20 3 then
granted the state's motion for a mistrial over defense objec-
tion. Following the mistrial, the district attorney moved to
"correct" the indictment to have it charge the defendant with
197. See State v. Johnson, 306 So. 2d 724, 731 (La. 1975) (Barham, J.,
dissenting).
198. 305 So. 2d 448 (La. 1975).
199. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 591-98.
200. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 592: "When a defendant pleads not guilty,
jeopardy begins when the first witness is sworn at the trial on the merits
201. Defense counsel moved that the trial court restrict the state to
evidence "pertaining to the crime of manslaughter." 305 So. 2d at 449. The
validity of such motion was not at issue due to the mistrial.
202. The indictment charged that the defendant "unlawfully killed [the
victim]." This is the short form indictment for manslaughter. Thus despite
the endorsement "Murder," the indictment charged manslaughter, not mur-
der. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 465.
203. The trial court viewed this as a "defect of substance" and refused to
permit the amendment. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 487.
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murder.20 4 After the indictment was amended, defendant
moved to quash, alleging double jeopardy. The trial court de-
nied the plea of double jeopardy.
On the basis of the provisions of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, the court held that the trial court erred
in refusing to sustain the defendant's plea of double jeopardy.
The court reasoned that the indictment as it originally ap-
peared was a "valid indictment for the crime of manslaugh-
ter."20 5 There was no "defect of substance" entitling the state
to a mistrial under article 487. There was no "legal defect in
the proceedings which would make any judgment entered
upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law." 206 Because the
original mistrial was not legally entered,20 7 jeopardy attached
at the first prosecution and barred re-prosecution.
Assuming that the court was correct in finding no "defect
of substance" in the indictment, is the state powerless, after
the first witness is sworn, to correct a lesser error or must the
district attorney simply proceed to verdict? For example, had
the trial court, albeit improperly, permitted the amendment
to charge the defendant with murder, what would the su-
preme court have done on appeal? Very probably it would
have reversed and remanded for a new trial.2 0 8
Had the court determined that the mistrial was valid
under Louisiana law, a federal constitutional problem would
have appeared. In Illinois v. Somerville209 a similar factual
setting developed. After the jury was selected and sworn, but
prior to the presentation of evidence, the district attorney
realized that the indictment lacked an essential averment.
Being unable under Illinois law to cure the defect by amend-
ment, the prosecutor, over defense objection, moved for a
mistrial. The invalidity of the indictment was a jurisdictional
defect not waived by failure to assert 210 and any verdict of
204. The state produced evidence to prove that the grand jury intended
to indict the defendant for murder.
205. 305 So. 2d at 451.
206. LA.vCODE CRIM. P. art. 775(3).
207. See id. art. 591.
208. Assuming, of course, conviction for murder. See id. art. 598.
209. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
210. The indictment charged theft but did not allege an intent to deprive
permanently. Because this was not a "formal defect" it could not be removed
by amendment. The error was discoverable without objection and was revers-
ible on appeal. It was not waived by the defendant's failure to object. See also
State v. James, 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974).
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guilty could have been upset on appeal. Following mistrial,
the district attorney amended the indictment and the defen-
dant was convicted. The defendant contended that the subse-
quent trial constituted double jeopardy.
Balancing the defendant's "valued right to have this trial
completed by a particular tribunal,"2 1' the United States Su-
preme Court concluded that:
[W]here the declaration of a mistrial implements a rea-
sonable state policy and aborts a proceeding that at best
would have produced a verdict that could have been upset
at will by one of the parties, the defendant's interest in
proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and
equally legitimate demand for public justice.212
The situation in Birabent is certainly distinguishable
from the situation in Somerville insofar as the Louisiana Su-
preme Court indicates that a valid conviction for manslaugh-
ter could have been obtained. Had that not been the case,
articles 487 and 775(3) would have mandated mistrial despite
the defendant's objection. In such a case, the court would
have been unable to avoid dealing with the federal constitu-
tional balance required by Somerville.213 Somerville involved
a mistrial granted before the presentation of any evidence.
Once the state begins to present its case the balance begins to
shift. Despite the state's interest in obtaining a judgment
which cannot be upset on appeal, at some point in the trial
the right of the accused to have the case go to verdict with
the possibility of acquittal or conviction of a lesser offense
(barring retrial for the greater) may emerge dominant.214 Be-
cause Birabent was solely grounded on the code, it gives no
hint as to the resolution of the federal constitutional problem.
Defining the Same Offense
Following State v. Didier,2 15 many Louisiana lawyers
were puzzled by the court's "gravamen test"216 for determin-
211. 410 U.S. at 466.
212. Id. at 471.
213. Id. at 472.
214. Cf. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
215. 262 La. 364, 263 So. 2d 322 (1972).
216. "Where the gravamen of the second offense is essentially included
within the offense for which first tried, the second prosecution is barred
because of the former jeopardy." 262 La. at 378, 263 So. 2d at 327.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ing whether the prosecution was for an offense "identical
with or a different grade of the same offense for which the
defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial. .... ,217 Several
cases highlight the problem of multiple charges arising from
a single transaction. City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson218 clar-
ifies to some extent the state's right to prosecute for multiple
traffic violations arising from the same incident. The defen-
dant was charged with running a flashing red light 219 and
driving while intoxicated. 220 At arraignment, the accused pled
guilty to running the light and not guilty to driving while
intoxicated. Defense counsel thereafter moved to quash the
latter charge on the basis of double jeopardy. The city court
sustained the defense motion and the city prosecutor applied
for writs.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the case must be
remanded for trial, clearly rejecting the defense argument
that the city was foreclosed from prosecuting for DWI be-
cause the two offenses arose from the same incident: "Louisi-
ana has not adopted a 'same transaction' test which would
prohibit prosecutions for different crimes committed during
one sequential, continuing course of conduct. '221 The court
avoided deciding whether or not jeopardy would bar prosecu-
tion if the city's only evidence of driving under the influence
of alcohol coincided in time with defendant's driving under
the light without stopping.222 It noted that the issue was not
before it because the state might "prove operation of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated for some point in time other than at
the involved intersection" and might offer evidence of driving
while intoxicated well beyond simply proceeding through an
intersection without stopping for the flashing red light.223
The court's result and reasoning are rational. It recog-
nized the need for a record of the proceedings to determine
whether the "gravamen" of the offenses is the same.224 Both
217. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 596(1).
218. 310 So. 2d 596 (La. 1975).
219. A violation of Baton Rouge Traffic Code § 47.
220. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647.
221. 310 So. 2d at 598. See also State ex rel. Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So.
2d 505 (La. 1974); State v. Pettle, 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973); State v. Richmond,
284 So. 2d 317 (La. 1973).
222. 310 So. 2d at 599-600.
223. Id. at 600.
224. See State v. Thames, 261 La. 96, 259 So. 2d 26 (1972). See also State v.
Comeaux, 249 La. 914, 192 So. 2d 122 (1966).
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State v. Bonfanti225 and Didier involved review of the second
prosecution after one conviction with a full record of the
second prosecution available to support the defense conten-
tion. In Jackson the court was only presented with the face of
the two affidavits. No record of the evidence supported the
defendant's contention that jeopardy barred the second pros-
ecution under the gravamen test. Furthermore, the two
crimes involved in Jackson are, unlike the situation in State
ex rel. Wikberg v. Henderson,226 quite different in law.
The hypothetical problem posed by the court in a footnote
to the decision gives an important insight to the court's think-
ing.227 Suppose the defendant is charged in two separate bills
of information with reckless driving and driving on the wrong
side of the road. On the face of the bills of information, are the
offenses the same? It may be impossible to determine by
inspection of the bills of information alone. But with re-
sponses to bills of particulars or with records of the two trials,
one could determine whether or not the state was essentially
charging that the defendant was guilty of reckless driving
because he was driving on the wrong side of the road. If that
is what made his driving "reckless" (driving on the wrong
side), then to permit prosecution for both offenses would vio-
late the principle that "conduct punished as one crime may
not be relabeled a different crime and be punished again. '228
225. 262 La. 153, 262 So. 2d 504 (1972).
226. 292 So. 2d 505 (La. 1973). The court could decide the issue of double
jeopardy based on the informations (and responses to bill of particulars) in a
case involving convictions of attempted armed robbery and felony murder
without resort to the evidence. The basis of the decision was the supreme
court's determination that attempted armed robbery is in effect a lesser
included offense of felony murder when the state relies on the theory of
felony murder.
227. City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, 310 So. 2d 596, 600 n.4 (La. 1975).
228. Id. at 599.
